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Abstract
We introduce a natural generalization of the golden cryptography,
which uses general unimodular matrices in place of the traditional Q
matrices, and prove that it preserves the original error correction prop-
erties of the encryption. Moreover, the additional parameters involved
in generating the coding matrices make this unimodular cryptogra-
phy resilient to the chosen plaintext attacks that worked against the
golden cryptography. Finally, we show that even the golden cryptog-
raphy is generally unable to correct double errors in the same row of
the ciphertext matrix, and offer an additional check number which, if
transmitted, allows for the correction.
Keywords: Fibonacci numbers, recurrence relation, golden ratio,
golden matrix, unimodular matrix, symmetric cipher, error correction,
chosen plaintext attack
1 Introduction
In a number of papers [7, 10, 11] and books [8, 12] Stakhov developed the
so-called “golden cryptography”, a system of encryption based on utilizing
matrices with entries being consecutive Fibonacci numbers with fast encryp-
tion/decryption and nice error-correction properties. It was applied to cre-
ating digital signatures [1], and somewhat similar techniques are used for
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image encryption and scrambling [3]. However, the golden cryptography and
its generalizations are vulnerable to the chosen plaintext attacks, which make
it insecure [6, 14]. As pointed out in [14], this is due to rigidity of the scheme,
it has too few parameters to make the generation of coding matrices hard to
backtrack. Their suggestion was to use an external hash function to add the
extra parameters, multiple encryption was suggested in [13], and the use of
Haar wavelets in [4].
We propose a much more intrinsic generalization of the golden cryptog-
raphy, which increases the number of free parameters while preserving its
error correction properties. The idea is to use an arbitrary unimodular ma-
trix in place of the so-called golden matrix Q. There are some mathematical
subtleties with implementing this idea, which we work out. In particular,
we prove that under mild assumptions there is an analog of the golden ra-
tio for unimodular matrices, what we call the unimodular ratio, and the
ratios of the coding matrix entries are close to it, a key property exploited
for error correction. While most types of errors are then correctable as in
the golden cryptography, it turns out that double errors in the same row of
the ciphertext matrix can not be corrected in general even there. This fact
was overlooked in [12, 11.5], and can not be remedied without transmitting
additional information. We suggest a particularly natural additional check
number, the column ratio, for this purpose.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the basics
of golden cryptography, in Section 3 we show how its attractive features
can be replicated using arbitrary unimodular matrices. This requires some
mathematical excursion into the existence of limits of ratios, which we provide
in Section 4. In Section 5 we show how most of the golden error correction
carries over to the unimodular cryptography, and in Section 6 we discuss
the issues with correcting double errors in a row. Finally, in Section 7 we
introduce the column ratio, and demonstrate how it resolves those issues.
2 Golden Cryptography
Consider the matrix Q =
[
1 1
1 0
]
. When this matrix is taken to the n-th
power the entries are the consecutive Fibonacci numbers:
Qn =
[
Fn+1 Fn
Fn Fn−1
]
, (1)
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and it follows from their properties that detQn = (−1)n. These matrices
Stakhov calls the “golden matrices”, because the ratios of the entries converge
to the golden ratio τ as n→∞. The idea of golden cryptography can now be
explained as follows. Split the plaintext into a sequence of blocks arranged
into groups of four, and use some permutation to place them as the entries
of a 2 × 2 plaintext matrix P =
[
p11 p12
p21 p22
]
. The ciphertext matrix C is
then obtained as C = P Qn, the chosen permutation and the number n
serve as the secret key. To decrypt, one only needs to apply the inverse
golden matrix Q−n = (−1)n
[
Fn−1 −Fn
−Fn Fn+1
]
, to wit P = C Q−n. Note that
detC = (−1)n detP , so detP can serve as a check number.
Example 1. Suppose we want to encrypt MATH. Representing each
letter by its number in the English alphabet (starting with 0) we get the
plaintext string 12 0 19 7. It can be arranged into a plaintext matrix
P =
[
12 0
19 7
]
. The check number to be sent to the receiver is detP = 84.
For this example we chose n = 10. Our coding golden matrix becomes
Q10 =
[
F11 F10
F10 F9
]
=
[
89 55
55 34
]
.
Multiplying P by it gives the ciphertext matrix:
C = P Q10 =
[
12 0
19 7
] [
89 55
55 34
]
=
[
1068 660
2076 1283
]
.
Comparing the check number to the determinant of the ciphertext matrix,
detC = 84 = detP , the receiver can be sure that the code was transmitted
correctly. Knowing the key to be n = 10 the receiver can decrypt the matrix
by inverting Q10, and multiplying C by the inverse C Q−10:
C Q−10 =
[
1068 660
2076 1283
] [
34 −55
−55 89
]
=
[
12 0
19 7
]
= P.
As a method of encryption, the golden cryptography is vulnerable to the
chosen plaintext attacks [6]. Namely, if P =
[
1 0
0 0
]
then C = P Qn =[
Fn+1 Fn
0 0
]
, so Fn, and then the secret key n, can be recovered from C,
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e.g. by using the Binet formula. This will remain the case even if we allow
fractional values for n, as in the generalized golden cryptography.
Nonetheless, the golden encryption/decryption is fast and has nice error
correction properties [12, 11.5]. Aside from the determinant check, there are
also built-in checking relations in C that do not require transmission of any
additional information. They exploit the recurrence properties of Fibonacci
numbers instead. Since the entries of P are positive integers for n even from
P = C Q−n we obtain the following inequalities:
c11Fn−1 − c12Fn ≥ 0
−c11Fn + c12Fn+1 ≥ 0
c21Fn−1 − c22Fn ≥ 0 (2)
−c21Fn + c22Fn+1 ≥ 0 ,
which yield
Fn
Fn−1
≤ c11
c12
,
c21
c22
≤ Fn+1
Fn
.
The properties of Fibonacci numbers imply that both ratios converge to the
golden ratio τ = 1+
√
5
2
, the case of odd n is analogous. So for large enough n
of any parity we have approximate relations c11 ≈ τc12, c21 ≈ τc22. Should
one or more of the ciphertext entries be miscommunicated these relations
can be used to recover the correct values, see Section 5.
3 Unimodular and coding matrices
Having such a narrow choice of coding options is undesirable in a number
of applications (particularly if one wishes to ensure security of encryption).
Some generalizations were offered by Stakhov himself [9], see also [2], [12,
11.3], the so-called generalized k-golden cryptography, and by Nalli [5]. The
golden matrices (1) have rather special, even “unique”, properties, and these
generalizations attempt to preserve as many of them as possible. However,
not all of them are relevant to cryptography. Let us summarize the properties
of Qn that make them useful for error correction:
1. The entries are consecutive elements of a sequence Fn satisfying a sec-
ond order recurrence relation.
2. Determinant is ±1.
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3. There is a limit of Fn+1
Fn
when n→∞.
A closer look at (2) shows that we do not need to choose entries from
a single sequence, a matrix of the form Mn =
[
An+1 An
Bn+1 Bn
]
would work as
long as An, Bn satisfy the same recurrence relation, and
An+1
An
, Bn+1
Bn
have the
same limit. If we set Mn = U
n for some matrix U with det = ±1, i.e. a
unimodular matrix, then the determinant condition will be satisfied as well.
While these conditions seem loose they are in fact quite restrictive, as the
next theorem shows.
Theorem 1. Let U be a matrix such that Un =
[
An+1 An
Bn+1 Bn
]
for some se-
quences An, Bn. Then either U is degenerate or U =
[
α 1
γ 0
]
. In particular,
if U is unimodular then U =
[
α 1
±1 0
]
.
Proof. Let U =
[
α β
γ δ
]
. Since U2 = U ·U we have
[
α
γ
]
= U
[
β
δ
]
, or explicitly
{
α = αβ + βδ
γ = γβ + δ2
If β 6= 1 we can solve for α, γ as follows{
α = βδ
1−β
γ = δ
2
1−β .
But then detU = βδ
1−β δ − δ
2
1−β β = 0, i.e. U is degenerate. If β = 1 then the
system reduces to α = α+ δ and γ = γ + δ2, i.e. it is satisfied by δ = 0 with
no conditions on α and γ. The last claim follows since detU = γ.
With only α as a free parameter we are not that far from the original
golden matrix Q with α = 1. Indeed, Qnk :=
[
k 1
1 0
]n
are the so-called k-
golden matrices of [9, 12], whose elements obey a simple generalization of
the Fibonacci recurrence relation F
(k)
n+1 = kF
(k)
n + F
(k)
n−1. As pointed out in
[14], encryption by the k-golden matrices is vulnerable to the same kind of
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chosen plaintext attack as encryption by the original golden matrices, it does
not even help to allow fractional values of n, as in the generalized k-golden
cryptography.
But the peculiarity of Theorem 1 is that severe restrictions on U follow
just from the initial multiplication U2 = U · U . Once this is guaranteed we
get Mn = U
n for all n as a bonus. This suggests that instead of taking Mn
to be a bare unimodular power, we should modify it by an additional initial
factor, i.e. set Mn = U
nM0.
Theorem 2. LetMn = U
nM0, whereM0 =
[
A1 A0
B1 B0
]
with A0, B0 arbitrarily
chosen, and
[
A1
B1
]
= U
[
A0
B0
]
. Then Mn =
[
An+1 An
Bn+1 Bn
]
for all n ≥ 0, and
An+1 = (trU)An − (detU)An−1 (3)
Bn+1 = (trU)Bn − (detU)Bn−1 .
Proof. Given A0, B0 define An, Bn by the recurrence relations:
An+1 = αAn + β Bn and Bn+1 = γ An + δ Bn . (4)
Note that this is consistent with the choice of values for A1, B1, and can be
rewritten as
[
An+1
Bn+1
]
= U
[
An
Bn
]
. Since the latter implies
[
An
Bn
]
= U
[
An−1
Bn−1
]
we have
Rn :=
[
An+1 An
Bn+1 Bn
]
= U
[
An An−1
Bn Bn−1
]
= URn−1 .
But by the definitions, R0 = M0, and Mn = UMn−1, therefore Rn = Mn for
all n ≥ 0.
From the recurrence relations (4) we have:
An+1 = αAn + β Bn = αAn + β (γ An−1 + δ Bn−1)
= αAn + β γ An−1 + β δ
An − αAn−1
β
= (α + δ)An − (αδ − β γ)An−1
= (trU)An − (detU)An−1 .
The case of Bn is analogous.
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Let us denote µ := detM0, then by definition detMn = µ (detU)
n, and
by Theorem 2:
µ = detM0 = A1B0 −A0B1 = (α− δ)A0B0 + βB20 − γA20 . (5)
We could impose an additional constraint to have µ = ±1, but this is not
really necessary for the error correction purposes. If detP is sent as the check
number along with C what matters is that we can independently recover
detP from detC, not that it necessarily be equal to it up to sign. Since
the encryption scheme is C = P Mn we have detC = (±1)nµ detP , and the
recovery is possible for any µ.
At this point one may be tempted to generalize further by taking Mn =[
An+1 An
Bn+1 Bn
]
with independently chosen A0, B0, A1 and B1, and An, Bn
computed according to (3) with t = trU and d = detU not necessarily
related to any matrix U :
An+1 = t An − dAn−1 (6)
Bn+1 = t Bn − dBn−1 .
We may not have Mn = U
nM0 anymore, but (6) can be rewritten in the
matrix form as [
An+1 An
Bn+1 Bn
]
=
[
An An−1
Bn Bn−1
] [
t 1
−d 0
]
.
Set S :=
[
t 1
−d 0
]
, and note that M1 = M0 S is automatically satisfied for
any choice of A0, B0, A1 and B1, so by induction Mn = M0S
n.
This is not, however, a real generalization, but rather an alternative repre-
sentation of Mn. Indeed, with the matrix U we could choose six parameters,
the four entries of U and A0, B0, while A1 and B1 were then determined by
them. With the matrix S we get to choose all four entries of M0, but in turn
it only has two parameters in it, t and d, which still total six. In other words,
we simply traded the diversity of U for the freedom in the choice of M0.
The main reason the golden and the k-golden cryptographies are vulner-
able to chosen plaintext attacks [6, 14] is that the system has too few free
parameters, n and n, k respectively. As shown in [14], the more parameters
are introduced the harder it is to recover them from equations obtained by
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choosing special plaintexts. The authors of [14] inject some extra parameters
by introducing an external hash function, and ask for a more intrinsic way
of doing so (other suggestions were made in [4, 13]). We believe that the Mn
coding matrices provide just that. For cryptographic intents and purposes,
Mn share the first two properties of the golden matrices listed at the begin-
ning of this section, with the added benefit of parameter choice freedom. In
the next section we will show that they share the third property as well.
4 Unimodular ratio
By Theorem 2, An, Bn satisfy a second order recurrence relation An+1 =
tAn − dAn−1, where t = trU and d = detU . Since we are interested in
convergence of the ratios let us rewrite it in terms of them:
An+1
An
= t− d
An
An−1
.
Assuming that An+1
An
−−−→
n→∞
ϕ we have that ϕ satisfies x = t− d
x
, or
x2 − tx+ d = 0 . (7)
The obvious problem is that this is a quadratic equation which generically
has two different roots, and the ratios can not converge to both at once.
Of course, this was already the situation with the Fibonacci numbers, but
there only one of the roots was positive, and since the Fibonacci numbers are
positive this is the one to which their ratios converged. But for d = detU > 0
equation (7) may have two positive roots.
Let f(x) := t − d
x
, and an :=
An+1
An
, then the ratio recurrence becomes
an+1 = t +
d
an
, and the roots of (7),
ϕ± :=
t±√t2 − 4d
2
, (8)
are the fixed points of f . Clearly, if an converge at all the limit would have
to be a fixed point, i.e. ϕ+ or ϕ−. If d > 0 they are real only for |t| ≥ 2
√
d,
and then both positive. Otherwise f has no real fixed points, and the ratios
diverge. We will writeր andց to denote monotone convergence, increasing
and decreasing, respectively.
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Theorem 3. Let an+1 = f(an) = t− dan with d > 0 and t ≥ 2d.
(i) If a0 ≥ ϕ+ then an ց ϕ+.
(ii) If ϕ− < a0 < ϕ+ then an ր ϕ+.
In particular, for any a0 > ϕ− we have an → ϕ+.
Proof. Note that for x > 0 the function f(x) is monotone increasing. There-
fore, for a0 ≥ ϕ+ we have a1 = f(a0) ≥ f(ϕ+) = ϕ+, and
a1 − a0 = t− d
a0
− a0 = − 1
a0
(a20 − ta0 + d) = −
1
a0
(a0 − ϕ−)(a0 − ϕ+) ≤ 0 .
Taking a1 as the new a0, and so on, we get by induction a0 ≥ a1 ≥ a2 ≥ · · · ≥
ϕ+. Thus, an is monotone decreasing and bounded below by ϕ+, therefore it
converges. The limit is a fixed point of f , and therefore ϕ+ since ϕ− < ϕ+.
This concludes the proof of (i). The proof of (ii) is analogous.
Theorem 4. Let an+1 = f(an) = t− dan with d < 0 and t > 0.
(i) If a0 ≥ ϕ+ then a2k ց ϕ+, a2k+1 ր ϕ+.
(ii) If 0 < a0 ≤ ϕ+ then a2k ր ϕ+, a2k+1 ց ϕ+.
In particular, for any a0 > 0 we have an → ϕ+.
Proof. This time for x > 0 the function f(x) is monotone decreasing, so if
a0 ≥ ϕ+ then a1 = f(a0) ≤ f(ϕ+) = ϕ+, and
a2 − a0 = t− d
t− d
a0
− a0 = − t
1 + ta0
(a20 − ta0 + d)
= − t
1 + ta0
(a0 − ϕ−)(a0 − ϕ+) ≤ 0 .
On the other hand, if 0 < a0 ≤ ϕ+ by the same reasoning a1 ≥ ϕ+, and
a2 ≥ a0.
Consider a0 ≥ ϕ+ again. Taking a1 as the new a0 we get a2 ≥ ϕ+, and
so on. By induction, a0 ≥ a2 ≥ a4 ≥ · · · ≥ ϕ+. Thus, a2k is monotone
decreasing and bounded below by ϕ+, therefore it converges. The limit is a
fixed point of f , and therefore ϕ+ since ϕ− < ϕ+. The case of a2k+1, and the
proof of (ii) are analogous.
As a matter of fact, one can show that in both cases an → ϕ+ for any a0 6=
0, ϕ−, essentially because ϕ− is a repulsive fixed point. But the convergence
may not be monotone since for a0 close to ϕ− the sequence may spend a long
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time in its vicinity before getting to approach ϕ+. In our conditions (with
t > 2
√
d for d > 0) one can show that the convergence is exponential, i.e.
an approaches ϕ+ faster than some geometric sequence approaches 0. From
now on we drop + from the notation and call
ϕ :=
t+
√
t2 − 4d
2
, (9)
the unimodular ratio.
Corollary 1. Suppose the entries of U are non-negative, and A0, B0 ≥ 1.
Then for d = 1 we have An+1
An
,
Bn+1
Bn
−−−→
n→∞
ϕ, and the convergence is exponen-
tial. The same holds for d = −1 if additionally trU > 2 and α, δ ≥ 1.
Proof. The conditions ensure that Theorems 3, 4 apply, in particular that
A1
A0
, B1
B0
> 1 > ϕ−.
5 Error correction
Encryption and decryption in the unimodular cryptography is completely
analogous to that in the golden cryptography. Namely, the plaintext is di-
vided into blocks of four arranged into a matrix, the encryption is given by
C = P Mn, and the decryption by P = CM
−1
n . The same goes for the error
correction described in [12, 11.5]. This is based on the determinant formula
detMn = µd
n, and the unimodular ratio checking relations analogous to the
ones of the golden cryptography: c11 ≈ ϕc12, c21 ≈ ϕc22. The proof is anal-
ogous to the golden case (given convergence of the ratios proved above), see
(2), and we omit it.
Let us briefly outline Stakhov’s error correction procedures. There are
four possible locations for a single error, represented by variables in the
following matrices:[
x c12
c21 c22
]
,
[
c11 y
c21 c22
]
,
[
c11 c12
z c22
]
, and
[
c11 c12
c21 v
]
.
The most effective method of single error correction involves using the uni-
modular ratio checking relations first. The receiver can determine in which
row the single error is located by determining which row does not satisfy the
checking relation. Next, the two possible incorrect elements can be estimated
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by assuming the other one to be correct. Finally, the correct solution will
satisfy the expected determinant equation:
xc22 − c12c21 = µdn detP
c11c22 − yc21 = µdn detP
c11c22 − c12z = µdn detP
c11v − c12c21 = µdn detP.
The following example demonstrates how a single error is detected and cor-
rected.
Example 2. For encryption we will use the following matrices:
U :=
[
2 1
1 1
]
and M0 =
[
1 0
1 1
]
.
The unimodular matrix U is known as the Arnold’s cat matrix [3] (taken
mod 1 it generates a chaotic map discovered by Arnold in 1960-s, who illus-
trated its action on an image of a cat). We have t = 3, d = 1, and
ϕ =
3 +
√
5
2
= 1 + τ ≈ 2.618... .
Suppose the following ciphertext matrix, encrypted with Mn = U
nM0 with
n = 4, was received,
C =
[
770 494
1846 705
]
,
along with the determinant check number, 126. We expect the determinant of
the ciphertext matrix to be 126. However C has the determinant of −369074,
thus there must be an error in it. In order to determine where the error is
located, we compute the row ratios:
770
494
≈ 1.559 ,
1846
705
≈ 2.618.
We see that the top row of the ciphertext matrix does not satisfy the checking
relation, but the bottom row does. We assume that there is a single error
11
in the top row and the bottom row is correct. First, we replace the element
c11 = 770 by the variable x and find an estimate for x with the unimodular
checking relation:
x ≈ 2.618 · 494 ≈ 1293.
If we let c11 = x and check the determinant of the new matrix, we find that
the determinant equals −359 6= 126, so c11 6= 1293. Next, we replace the
element c12 = 494 by the variable y and estimate y with the unimodular
checking relation:
y ≈ 770
2.618
≈ 294.
Now the determinant equals 126, which means c12 = 294. The corrected
matrix is
C =
[
770 294
1846 705
]
.
For double error correction it is crucial that the check number detP be
transmitted correctly. The determinant of the ciphertext matrix is equated
to µdn detP , and the two elements assumed incorrect are solved for by ap-
plying the unimodular ratio checking relations. Double errors fall into three
categories: diagonal, column and row errors. There are two types of the
diagonal double errors in the ciphertext matrix, the diagonal error and the
anti-diagonal error, respectively[
x c12
c21 v
]
and
[
c11 y
z c22
]
.
Both cases yield a factoring problem:
xv = c12c21 + µd
n detP and
yz = c11c22 − µdn detP.
The right hand side of each equation is known, thus the correct solution is
one of its factor pairs. If n was chosen to be sufficiently large this factoring
problem can be rather challenging, as the number to be factored should be
quite large. But with high probability only the correct solution satisfies the
unimodular ratio checking relations. This simplifies the factoring problem
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considerably. For the errors along the diagonal the solutions are approxi-
mated by
x ≈ ϕc12 and v ≈ c21
ϕ
;
and for the errors along the anti-diagonal by
y ≈ c11
ϕ
and z ≈ ϕc22.
With these estimates the receiver only needs to try dividing the product by
numbers close to them, as opposed to finding all factor pairs. If there are no
factor pairs around the estimated values, a different double error should be
assumed.
There are two types of double column errors in the ciphertext matrix,[
x c12
z c22
]
and
[
c11 y
c21 v
]
,
which lead to solving the following linear Diophantine equations, respectively
xc22 − c12z = µdn detP and
c11v − yc21 = µdn detP.
There are infinitely many solution pairs that would satisfy them. The desired
solution will also satisfy the unimodular ratio checking relations. The receiver
can estimate the solutions as
x ≈ ϕc12 and z ≈ ϕc22 ;
y ≈ c11
ϕ
and v ≈ c21
ϕ
.
Again, one can search for a solution pair to the Diophantine equations near
the estimates. If there are no Diophantine solutions near the estimates, a
different type of error should be assumed.
6 Row Errors
It may seem that the correction of row errors should be analogous to the
correction of column errors, but the symmetry is broken by the fact that the
unimodular ratio checking relations relate entries in a row, not in a column.
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The issue arises already in the golden cryptography, but it is overlooked
in [12, 11.5]. As we will see, without additional information double row
errors can not be corrected. There are two cases of double row errors in the
ciphertext matrix, [
x y
c21 c22
]
and
[
c11 c12
z v
]
,
which lead to the following linear Diophantine equations, respectively
xc22 − yc21 = µdn detP and
c11v − c12z = µdn detP. (10)
With the diagonal and column double errors we had at least one correct
element in each row, which allowed us to identify the correct solution more or
less uniquely. But if both elements in a row are faulty, the checking relations
generally do not narrow down the available choices sufficiently. Indeed, in
the first case, say, we have∣∣∣∣xy − c21c22
∣∣∣∣ = µdn detPyc22 .
Suppose |µ| = |d| = 1, as for the Q matrix or the Arnold’s cat matrix from
Example 2, and n is large. Then the entries of C will be much larger than
the entries of P , and therefore the ratio on the right will be small for all
solutions to the Diophantine equation (10). But that means that the ratios
of all solutions to the equation will be close to the unimodular ratio ϕ, and
the corresponding checking relation is of no help in correcting the transmitted
data.
Example 3. Suppose the matrix P =
[
8 24
19 2
]
is encrypted with the Q
matrix and the key n = 6. The deterimant of P is −440. If the top row of
the ciphertext matrix contains errors,
C =
[
x y
263 162
]
,
the Diophantine equation to solve is 162x− 263y = −440. The solutions are
x = 263k + 33 and y = 162k + 22, with k ∈ Z. The following table displays
low positive k solutions to the Diophantine equations, and the ratios x
y
for
each solution.
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k x y x
y
0 33 22 1.50000
1 296 184 1.60870
2 559 349 1.61561
3 822 508 1.61811
4 1085 670 1.61940
5 1348 832 1.62019
As expected, the ratios are all quite close to the golden ratio 1.618... . The
correct solution, based on the original encryption, has k = 1. However, the
ratio closest to the golden ratio occurs when k = 3. This demonstrates that
the row ratio checking relations can not correct the double row errors even
in the original golden cryptography.
Depending on the situation, the receiver may be able to rule out the un-
likely solutions and pick the most likely one. Because we assumed that all
plaintext elements were greater than or equal to zero, the negative solution
pairs are ruled out. Additionally, the sizes of the ciphertext elements depend
on plaintext elements and the entries of the coding matrices. If the range
for the plaintext elements is known, the range for the ciphertext elements
can be found. However, this method of correction relies on all four plain-
text entries being within a very small range. For example, if the plaintext
entries represent letters of the alphabet, coded from 0 to 25, the receiver
can determine the expected range of ciphertext entries and narrow down the
acceptable Diophantine solutions. Still, too many solutions may be left, as
the following example demonstrates.
Example 4. Suppose the matrix P =
[
19 7
2 10
]
is encrypted using the
Arnold’s cat matrix and the initial matrix M0 =
[
1 0
1 1
]
with a key of n = 4.
The check number sent is 176. The receiver determined that the top row
must contain a double error:
C =
[
x y
450 172
]
.
The resulting Diophantine equation, 172x − 450y = 176 has solutions x =
225k + 158 and y = 86k + 60, with k ∈ Z. Because the plaintext elements
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are known to range from 0 to 25 we have,
0 ≤ x ≤ 25(An+1 +Bn+1) and
0 ≤ y ≤ 25(An +Bn).
Thus the receiver can determine the following bounds on the possible solu-
tions,
0 ≤ x ≤ 2225 and
0 ≤ y ≤ 850.
Nonetheless, there are still ten values of k which give Diophantine solutions
x and y within this range. Moreover, narrowing the range of plaintext entries
to from 0 to 25 is likely to compromise security.
7 Column ratio
Although we do not have ratios of column entries converge to the unimodular
ratio, it turns out that the ratios in both columns converge to the same value,
we call this common value the column ratio.
Corollary 2. In conditions of Corollary 1 we have c21
c11
≈ c22
c12
for large n.
Proof. By definition of encryption, we have for the ratios of the column
entries:
c21
c11
=
p21An+1 + p22Bn+1
p11An+1 + p12Bn+1
=
An+1
Bn+1
p21 + p22
An+1
Bn+1
p11 + p22
;
c22
c12
=
p21An + p22Bn
p11An + p12Bn
=
An
Bn
p21 + p22
An
Bn
p11 + p12
.
Since in conditions of Corollary 1 the ratios An+1
An
and Bn+1
Bn
converge to the
same limit we also have An+1
Bn+1
≈ An
Bn
for large n. But this implies c21
c11
≈ c22
c12
.
Unlike the unimodular ratio, which only depended on An and Bn, the
column ratio also depends on the plaintext matrix P . The next example
demonstrates how much the column ratio can vary.
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Example 5. Of the two plaintext matrices below, P1 has elements in
a relatively small range, whereas P2 has the same bottom row elements,
but larger top row elements. Observe how the resulting ciphertext matrices
reflect those differences.
P1Mn =
[
7 8
3 5
]
×
[
21 8
13 5
]
=
[
251 96
128 49
]
= C1 ,
P2Mn =
[
56 45
3 5
]
×
[
21 8
13 5
]
=
[
1761 673
128 49
]
= C2 .
In C1 the column ratio is approximately 1.96, in C2 it is approximately 13.8.
Thus, if only one row is known in the ciphertext matrix, there is no way to
estimate the magnitude of the other row without knowing the ratios of the
column elements.
To allow the row double error correction one needs to send an additional
check number, e.g. the column ratio. Even modest precision in it suffices
to recover the mistransmitted row elements. Of course, there is a trade-off
involved as it increases the size and reduces the security of the required trans-
mission. The following examples demonstrate the double row error correction
with the column ratio.
Example 6. Recall the faulty ciphertext matrix from Example 3,
C =
[
x y
263 162
]
.
Suppose that in addition to the Diophantine equation 162x− 263y = −440
the column ratio is known c21
c11
≈ c22
c12
≈ 0.9. Then the solutions can be
estimated as x ≈ 263
0.9
≈ 292 and y ≈ 162
0.9
≈ 180. As seen from the table in
Example 3, the solution pair closest to the estimates clearly has k = 1. Thus,
the corrected matrix is
C =
[
296 184
263 162
]
.
Similarly, the column ratio can be applied to a ciphertext matrix en-
crypted with a unimodular matrix.
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Example 7. Suppose that the plaintext matrix
P =
[
14 20
9 7
]
is encrypted with the Arnold’s cat matrix, n = 4, and the initial matrix
M0 =
[
1 0
1 1
]
. The ciphertext matrix is sent via a noisy channel and received
as
C˜ =
[
1325 321
733 280
]
with check numbers detP = −82 and c21
c11
≈ c22
c12
≈ 0.5. The receiver finds that
the top row does not satisfy the unimodular checking relation, and the single
error correction methods do not correct the matrix. Finally, it is assumed
that the top row contains double errors, and
C =
[
x y
733 280
]
.
This gives the Diophantine equation 280x− 733y = −82. Using the column
ratio 0.5, we estimate x ≈ 733
0.5
≈ 1466 and y ≈ 280
0.5
≈ 560. Some possible so-
lution pairs to the Diophantine equation around the estimates are (717, 274),
(1450, 554), (2183, 834) and (2916, 1114). Clearly, the solution nearest the
approximation is x = 1450 and y = 554. Letting c11 = 1450 and c12 = 554
the correct ciphertext matrix is obtained:
C =
[
1450 544
733 280
]
.
8 Conclusions
We introduced a generalization of the golden cryptography that preserves
its error correction benefits while increasing security of encryption by using
extra free parameters. In particular, the generalization is not susceptible to
the known types of chosen plaintext attacks. While all of the golden error
correction carries over to the unimodular case, we uncovered that correction
of double row errors is problematic already there, and offered a solution based
on sending an additional check number, the column ratio.
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Although the unimodular cryptography is more secure than the golden
cryptography in terms of known attacks, further research is needed to make
sure that it can not be compromised in some more elaborate ways. The
effect of transmitting the column ratio on security of encryption also needs
to be investigated. It is likely that additional layers of encryption, such as
those suggested in [4, 13, 14], are needed to secure even the unimodular
cryptography transmissions.
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